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I. Marriage And Modern Freedom 
       The issue of the breakdown of the marriage bond in Western societies has become a 
routine object of social and moral concern, political and public debate.1 This is striking, 
given that in most non-western cultures still and in every society heretofore, marriage has 
been insisted upon as the required precondition for the mating of men and women as the 
act that initiates and sustains the family order considered the foundation of all tribal and 
civil life. As the bedrock of communal social order and wellspring of a whole complex of 
coincident cultural values, it has traditionally been not only legally required, regulated 
and protected, but regarded as divinely ordained and thus to be sacramentally 
consecrated.  
      Contemporary statistics tell a different story; the question is seriously raised how the 
marriage tie can survive the optionalism that dominates modern attitudes or whether, 
after all, it is an outmoded institution whose time has run out. The rate of divorce soars 
beyond one out of every two; the serial polygamy of successive remarriage is not only 
accepted but prepared for in prenuptial agreements; the incidence of single parenthood, 
so-called, has increased by leaps and bounds. The legitimization of liaisons once thought 
beyond the moral pale -- 'open' marriage, single parenthood, homosexual coupling -- now 
test the boundaries of established legal and moral definition based in most cultures on the 
gold standard of once in a lifetime monogamy.  
     Contemporary moralists interpret these changes negatively as a collapse of 'traditional 
family values' in a popular culture which, in the name of sexual freedom, has given itself 
over to the frantic pursuit of unlimited promiscuity and sexual anarchy. Nor is it 
Christians alone who view Western society as in decay; it is the principal charge other 
world-religious cultures now make against the West. Efforts to reverse the libidinal tide 
prove notoriously ineffectual, however, for the spirit of 'decadence' is far too alive, far too 
certain of its right, to be influenced by attempts to reinstate former moralities or 
resuscitate old time religion. For what they oppose is the irresistible force of a principle, 
the modern principle of freedom which, having broken in upon human consciousness and 
human history, simply will not be denied.  
                                                
1 As a typical summary of relevant issues, Wolfe, C. (Ed) The Family, Civil Society and the State, New 
York, 1998. 
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       The freedom of the individual is modernity's absolute; from it the whole 
contemporary culture of subjective or natural right draws its energy. How this freedom is 
actually understood and applied is thus crucial. It can readily be agreed that in practice 
the vaunted right to sexual freedom is widely exploited to justify what may be described 
more conventionally as erotic excess and plain lasciviousness, but it no doubt has also 
just the opposite, and positive, connotation of the liberation of individuals from what may 
be seen as the prison of a former legalistic and moralistic obsessions with sexual 
relations, identifications and fixations. The idea of freedom simply has this ambiguity in 
it: it implies self-determination but also caprice, conscience but also wantonness; at once 
a principle of peace and of violence, of community and anarchy.  
    It is principally the presumption of freedom that underlay the ultra-modernist 
revolutions that dominated the twentieth century. It is characteristic of their outlook that 
everything is made to flow from the assumption, wholly dogmatic, that freedom is more 
than a mere moral ideal or intellectual principle but the actual truth of human existence. 
'Man', 'the individual' is said to be freedom become flesh; there is no freedom other than 
this here-and-now human freedom. That this alone is absolute truth becomes the chief 
article of faith of a para-religious, 'ideological' spirit for which freedom is directly 
identical with human nature as such, thus also the immediately given end of all human 
practice.  
       The psychology and sociology of the 20th century are founded on this dogma which 
is also plainly enough witnessed in common everyday assumptions: that democracy is the 
only valid political system, that justice is founded on individual right, that free choice is 
the basis of social order, that no wisdom preempts the individual's own opinion, that 
every problem is open to a human solution, that techno-economic conquest of nature is 
prime mover in human practice, that the analysis of instinctive human behaviour is the 
true business of psychology. The common theme is the certainty individuals have of 
themselves as freedom incarnate; of being, though finite in a thousand ways, nonetheless 
the ultimate reference point for whatever is or is not, ought to be or ought not, makes 
sense or nonsense, can or cannot be done. Ethically radical individual freedom yields the 
principle that one has an absolute right to choose, indifferent to whether what is actually 
chosen be judged 'good' or 'evil', for this judgement too belongs to the chooser. This 
principle is devastating when applied to social and ethical institutions since it suggests 
that these are tolerable only where they are answerable to individuals and exist solely to 
advance their rights, interests and advantages. Accordingly, institutions that should claim 
an authority independent of these subjective interests must be summarily declared 
illegitimate: freedom demands their overthrow.  
      The authority of the institution of marriage would seem especially compromised by 
an ethics wherein individual freedom preempts every other basis of human compact. It is 
more than that in a marriage between free individuals the feelings, interests and choices 
of each must be absolutely respected: they must be paramount, taking precedence over 
the compact itself. This runs entirely contrary to the traditional language of the marriage 
sacrament which typically expresses quite the opposite sentiment and priority, enjoining 
individuals to join together as one and to submit themselves to this union. For individuals 
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who assume their freedom to be immediately their own, as given and unlimited, nothing 
would appear to be more offensive than that matrimony be thought binding in the sense 
of requiring an unreasoned, unchosen submission to the institution itself. They will 
demand to be seen, not only as freely choosing to marry at all, but as retaining and 
enjoying their freedom within the marriage thereafter.  
      Where the ultra-modernist dogma of individual freedom holds sway in human 
relations, the only legitimate grounds for marrying are subjective ones. It may be to 
consummate a consuming sexual infatuation, to affirm a commitment to an otherwise 
casual relationship, to facilitate the legal status of children or property, to defer kindly to 
traditional scruples of society or family, to provide occasion for friends to celebrate a 
couple's romantic liaison; something of the kind. The standard of subjective choice is the 
common theme: the married state is viewed as having no objective ethical or logical 
status of its own; it is certainly not, as was traditionally assumed, the sole precondition of 
entry into sexual partnership. It is for the participating individuals alone to decide what 
the terms of their marriage shall be. It has accordingly become common for couples not 
to bother with marriage at all, to marry only after years of living together on other terms, 
to set contractual preconditions under which the marriage is to be tolerated or annulled, to 
agree that the marriage remain 'open'; even to argue seriously (and not inconsistently) that 
a couple truly dedicated to and respectful one another will deliberately reject the option 
of marriage as an archaic limitation upon an authentic loving relationship.  
      If a majority still chooses to go through the customary rituals, even then they are 
rarely undergone in the traditional spirit of a religious sacrament and explicit legal act. 
Vows declaring two individuals permanently one in the sight of God, a bond no one may 
put asunder, are taken as mostly a quaint rhetoric or archaic poetry. To take such words 
seriously would contravene what alone is infinitely important: the certainty individuals 
have of their absolute freedom, requiring as it does that self-esteem take precedence over 
other-esteem and certainly esteem for long-abandoned divinities. The idea of a 'bond' is 
tolerated only where understood as a metaphor for good intention. Otherwise, marriage is 
taken for the most part as an optional extension of what is vaguely called a 'relationship', 
i.e., a sexual compact entered into and sustained by the force of subjective commitment 
alone, a commitment which can be just as freely withdrawn as made. On these terms the 
ideal relationship is one in which its participants are at once engaged and disengaged; at 
once liberated from the condition to which they are also committed.  
       To the conservative traditionalist, marriage so reduced to a subjective relationship 
only is intrinsically unstable, tentative and unfulfilling -- not to speak of 'immoral'. It 
makes marriage a wholly arbitrary option within a culture otherwise given over to 
promiscuous sexual 'openness'. The sacrament of marriage is in this context at best a 
matter of romantic deference to tradition, confirming a decision already taken to 'live 
together'. What is said over the couple or who says it matters little, as does where or how 
the wedding takes place: in a church, a lawyers office or a hot-air balloon.  
      The incompatibility between individual freedom and institutional life, where a 
principle of positive liberation appears also as a principle of social and moral decadence, 
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has become a major contemporary issue on many fronts. The issue is not a new one but 
belongs to the recent history of humanism in its attempt to work out how human freedom 
can be understood as the basis of a new order and civilization. The leading strains of 
nineteenth and twentieth century were concerned chiefly with this task, and with specific 
regard to their attitudes toward the marriage bond three in particular are instructive to 
consider: the socioeconomic theory of marriage, the psychoanalytical and the ethical. The 
first and the second are generally negative with respect to the consequence of modern 
freedom for the family in general; the third has a positive view. Engels and Freud provide 
examples of the former negative, doctrinaire approach, Hegel of the positive or 
speculative; their differences stemming from the manner in which each understood 
freedom as the prime motive force in human relations: whether as labour or libido, or as 
love.  
 
II. Marriage As A Repressive Institution 
i. Ultra-modernist Anthropology  
       The perennial difficulty with giving a philosophical account of marriage lies in its 
having at once a natural and an ethical basis, an ambiguity generative of tensions and 
contradictions in practice as well as in theory. That marriage inevitably involves the 
sexual, procreative impulse common to all animals tempts the view that the institution 
itself is wholly biological in origin, driven and sustained by instincts no different than 
found in other animals. If the married state is characterized as more than this, as having 
an authentically legal, moral and public status, this can be thought to describe no more 
than peculiar habits and customs which the human species has somehow developed to 
stabilize reproduction and ensure species survival. The institution of marriage can thus 
still be seen as grafted upon what otherwise remains a purely sexual-organic liaison  
      Yet it remains the fact that, wherever marriage has existed among human beings 
(namely everywhere), it has in all cultures been viewed as primarily an ethical union, that 
is, specifically not a liaison entered into spontaneously but with deliberation and 
consciousness, a bond ceremonially authenticated according to some rubric meant to 
bring the sexual relation under a law that is higher than the natural. Apart from the 
timeless appeal, romantic or simply lascivious, to the 'illicit' pleasures of sexuality, it is 
only in very recent times that a serious intellectual and 'post-moral' case has been made 
for seeing non-marital sexual activity as a right, even a virtue. Indeed, far from socially 
destructive or morally improper, open non-, pre- and extra-marital sexuality has come to 
be regarded as itself an expression of freedom, its indulgence a liberation from the 
repressive strictures of traditional sexual morality.  
      It is a view that owes its development to those nineteenth century philosophers who 
attempted, in various ways, to sketch the terms of an ultra-modern, post-traditional 'return 
to nature': Marx, Nietzsche, Engels, Freud et al. The return they would advocate, 
however, was not to 'nature' in the older sense of a mechanistic order external to mind or 
spirit, but to a humanized nature or naturalized humanity in the sense of a reductionism 
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which, though recognizing the distinctiveness of the human, would see it nonetheless as 
continuous with nature. The followers of Feuerbach, for example, never tired of insisting 
that 'materialism' as they intended it was not the materialism of Enlightenment, limited 
precisely in presupposing a de-humanized nature no less metaphysical in conception than 
the de-naturalized reason or mind of traditional philosophy. Nietzsche also, from a 
reverse perspective, would insist that the existential psychology he would install as "the 
new queen of the sciences" is not the older psychology of the soul or spirit but the very 
contrary: a psychology of specifically human instincts generalized as a universal 
principle of nature. This collapsing of the distinction between spiritual and natural is thus 
anti-metaphysical, anti-theological and anti-moralist in very principle. It falls generally 
into two types: as an enthusiasm for evolutionary biology as providing the clue to a new, 
naturalistic analysis of human psychology and culture, and a spiritualistic enthusiasm for 
the occult deriving from the idea of spirit as a para-natural dimension. From either 
standpoint, that nature be viewed as a reality alien to conscious human life is no less 
unacceptable than that the account of the human leaves the immediacy of human nature 
out of account.  
      In the post-Hegelian era, the coincidence of the spiritual and the natural in the human 
being as such was to become the general presumption. On this account ultra-modernist 
thought would seek the overthrow of all former theology and philosophy, supplanting 
them with ideological and existential dogmas that would render the human realm as 
absolute unto itself. Freedom comes to be represented as concretely manifest in human 
self-existence and human self-activity, that is, wholly in biological or socioeconomic 
terms. In this revolutionary rendering of the ultimacy of human being and the human 
world is born the spirit of absolutism, the soul of ultra-modernist culture. It set itself 
against the politics, morality, aesthetics, religion and philosophy of tradition, accusing it 
of having sought falsely to ground the human in the transcendent, hence in a manner 
hostile to the appreciation of human freedom as a living and present spiritual-natural 
identity.  
       To the extent in absolutism that freedom comes to be determined specifically and 
exclusively as immediate in the existing individual, whether as such or collectively, to 
that extent freedom itself acquires a 'naturalistic' meaning. The objective of the new 
ideologies was accordingly to produce a doctrine of 'man' wholly from the side of nature, 
appealing to some para-natural quality or capacity the possession of which distinguishes 
man from the animals but which makes no reference at all to any un-natural ground in 
God, reason, self-consciousness, spirit or whatever. The new human sciences they 
founded opposed themselves to the so-called 'alienated' freedom of philosophical 
idealism and the theological tradition, to which they presumed themselves the successors; 
they sought rather to adapt natural-scientific method to take account of the human 
dimension in nature while avoiding any simple reversion to the simplistic physicalism of 
the older sciences. The newer biological sciences and especially the theory of evolution 
provided a principal resource for this enterprise.  
      This ultra-modernist 'overcoming' owed its origin nonetheless to the principal fruits of 
the same speculative tradition against which it turned, namely the key idea of a 
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unification of the spiritual and the natural developed in modern philosophy from 
Descartes to Hegel. How this principle can be at once preserved, and yet wrested from all 
its historical or philosophical mediations and asserted dogmatically as the immediate 
truth of human freedom, is a problem that has continue to vex post-modern thinking ever 
since. Proposals for a theory of 'natural' human freedom have developed generally along 
two distinct lines, one defining freedom in terms of a practical, economic-technological 
subordination of nature, the other defining freedom rather as the very immediacy of the 
particular individual's existence. These two positions, sociological and psychological 
humanism, continue directly to oppose and sustain one another. To a freedom thought to 
belong immediately to the existing individual as such, the idea of a freedom dependent on 
practical-material circumstances is anathema; to the practical will whose aim is to 
achieve an objectively free human world, the idea that freedom is no more than an 
existential quality is equally to be shunned. This ambiguity had been already recognized 
by Hegel who perceived human freedom, as 'human', to be finite in precisely this sense: 
that where grasped only in its immediacy, that is, only on its natural side, it falls 
inevitably into these two contrary absolutisms, a practical and an existential, each 
contradicting the other and each fatally unable to realize the freedom it would claim as 
concrete.  
     It is just into such a division that post-philosophical absolutism after Hegel actually 
fell, seeking to transmute the principle of freedom into human terms. Both equally 
demanded an end to all theology, metaphysics and morality, both were hostile to 
traditional institutions, both confronted each other from the beginning in mutual, 
irreconcilable opposition.2 From their initial statements with Comte and Schopenhauer, 
through various mutations of the later Marxist-Existentialist standoff, to current attempts 
of the post-philosophers to be free of all 'metanarratives' as such, positivism and nihilism 
have dominated thinking since Hegel. In what follows, two writers who later gave these 
post-philosophical arguments a more popular form, Friedrich Engels and Sigmund Freud, 
are briefly consulted to note how the institution of marriage fares in their hands; then we 
return to the question as to how, in a properly philosophical view, not only are freedom 
and marriage reconcilable but their reconciliation is essential to a true account of one and 
the other.  
ii. Marriage as Means of Production  
       While the traditional fine words of religion and romanticism remain the lingua 
franca of formal marriage, the institution itself has been rendered impotent and chaotic 
by ever more extreme appeals to the sanctity of the freedom of the individual. But in 
addition to the hollowness introduced by a pervasive culture of choice-centred 
subjectivism, more overt obstacles to the survival of marriage exist in the continuing 
impact of para-philosophical ideologies spawned in the past century which directly 
opposed the idea of an ethical or spiritual basis of human institutions and would replace it 
with a counter-philosophical, natural-scientific anthropology which attempts to discover 
                                                
2 For an elaboration, see my "The New Faith: Strauss, Kierkegaard and the Theological Revolution", 
Dionysius, xii (1988) and "The Beginning of the End of Metaphysics", Dionysius, xv (1991). 
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the origin of institutions wholly in biological or evolutionary causes. Thus, however 
festooned with ritualistic paraphernalia and symbolic confections, courtship and marriage 
are to be described as nothing more than extensions and elaborations of sexual mating as 
found among all animals, entirely instinctive in meaning and motivation and having no 
other significance beyond the biological maintenance of the species. Like the bow-and-
arrow or cooking, marriage is an evolutionary tool for the regulation of reproduction to 
ensure the collective economic welfare of a human herd.  
      As Marx's collaborator in the development and defense of 'scientific socialism' it was 
Engels' special preoccupation to seek its justification in the natural sciences. The aim of 
'dialectical materialism' (as also the root of its self-inconsistency) is the reinterpretation 
of freedom as an aspect of human 'species-activity', i.e., the productive behaviour through 
which an animal species acquires its means of subsistence. Human species-activity is 
unique only in that it involves the evolutionary contingencies of a larger brain, an 
opposable thumb and the like, differences which permit the human animal to develop a 
much wider range of technical skills. From this difference alone, it is thought, the whole 
of human society and history may be deduced, without any appeal to religious or ethical-
philosophical concepts. 'Freedom' here will mean only the free exercise of such species-
productivity, and if society as it stands is so ordered as to inhibit free access on the part of 
its members to the means of production, then dialectical tensions result leading inevitably 
to the demand for liberation from this impediment. On this swings the whole history of 
the world; it is all that need be said regarding the human aspiration to freedom.  
       The remarkable enthusiasm for anthropological studies in and since the nineteenth 
century was nurtured by this absolute-humanist ideal of a wholly socio-economic 
account, not only of the origins of specific customs and institutions but of the human 
community itself. Engels was driven by the wish to discover in the very dawning of 
human society the pure paradigm of a primitive communist order of life, assuring 
absolute equality of access to the means of production, as a way of justifying a 
revolutionary understanding of subsequent civilization, seen as a falling away from this 
original condition -- a common tactic in all ultra-modernist ideologies.3 In his The Origin 
of the Family, Private Property and the State he surveys recent anthropological literature 
on the origin and development of the institution of matrimony in particular. Noting that 
the marital practices of primitive peoples are typically at variance with what is 
paradigmatic in later civilized societies, namely the institution of monogamy, Engels 
turns this commonplace observation on its head: earlier customs regarding group 
marriage, rules against clan incest, polygyny and the like are not to be seen as rude and 
confused precursors of a civilized ethic of monogamy, but as way-stations in a long 
history of cultural decay culminating in the institution of monogamous marriage as 
representing the final corruption.  
                                                
3 Conjuring cultures predating those for which there is any reasonable archaeological evidence is a typical 
ploy of nineteenth and twentieth century romanticism, as is distorting known ancient cultures in support of 
ultra-modernist ideologies, as Nietzsche or Heidegger. Cf. my "The Post-Philosophical Attack on Plato" 
Animus 4 (1999), www.mun.ca/animus/1999v4/Jackson4. 
JACKSON:  FREEDOM AND THE TIE THAT BINDS: MARRIAGE AS  
AN ETHICAL INSTITUTION 
 
 122 
       Engels had a considerable acquaintance with, and enthusiasm for, the scientific 
theories of his day: the transformation of energies, the discovery of the living cell, the 
theory of evolution etc. He drew on them in support of a dialectical account of nature 
designed to facilitate an anthropology that could justify a politics of freedom-as-equality 
consistent with a seamless continuity between nature and humanity.4 The principal 
feature distinguishing man from other animals, he argued, is 'labour', the unique capacity 
for advanced forms of natural productive and reproductive activity made possible through 
the evolution of fingers and toes, a "brain capable of consciousness", unique teeth and 
tongue and the like.  
According to the materialistic conception, the determining factor in history 
is ... the production and reproduction of immediate life -- on the one side, 
the production of the means of existence, of food, clothing and shelter and 
the tools necessary for that production; on the other side the production of 
human beings themselves, the propagation of the species.5  
       Labour for Engels is "infinitely more" than a mere aspect of human behaviour: "we 
have to say that labour created man himself."6 In support, he recites a familiar Darwinian 
tale of apes descending from trees, liberating hands as first among tools, the evolution 
from 'savage' grazer to 'barbarian' meat-eater, requiring the harnessing of fire, the 
domestication of animals and so on. With these 'events' begin the long history of the 
"emancipation of man", conceived as evolution extended into the progressive 
technologization of production.  
      Among all the innovations contributing to this emancipation, on Engels' account, is 
the "invention" of society, described as a regime of absolute equality among individuals 
in the common production of the means of subsistence and the reproduction of the race. 
As freedom for Engels has reference only to equality in natural-productive activity, a free 
society has nothing to do with conformity to some divinely established or rational ethical 
order, but with the recovery of an original 'natural' instinct to social equality that has been 
perverted. And this ideal equality is to apply to free access, not only to the means (and 
fruits) of material production, but also to the means of propagating the species: "sexual 
equality". That Engels chooses to speak of sexual 'reproduction' as itself a form of 
'production' is of key significance for his view on marriage and the family.  
      Conceived in evolutionary terms, social organization has the aim of herd-solidarity, a 
technique of preservation no different in principle than tooth, claw, venom or flight in the 
case of other species. As the chief means of survival of a species too weak to defend itself 
otherwise against predators, the requirement of herd-solidarity -- of 'equality' -- is for 
human beings absolute, requiring among other things a reproductive regime unique to the 
species. Engels notes that while a whole range of human marital customs is found also 
found among animals -- polygyny in wolves, polyandry in bees, monogamy in bears and 
                                                
4 This concern with reinterpreting the sciences of nature consistent with a seamless "transition from nature 
to man" is the theme of Engels' Dialectics of Nature, (tr. Dutt) New York, 1940. 
5 Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, New York, Int. Publishers, 1972, p.87. 
6 Ibid, p.251. 
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birds, etc. -- none qualify as the uniquely human form of the sexual relation. Indeed, what 
is remarkable among other animals, Engels claims, is that the formation of exclusive 
sexual liaisons among males and females inevitably breeds jealousies and fractious 
competitions where only the fittest survive, a circumstance that would be inimical to the 
welfare of the human herd. The 'invention' of society required a new regime of non-
exclusive sexuality as alone compatible with maintaining herd solidarity. In short, 
promiscuous sexuality is the reproductive relation most consistent with the preservation 
of the human community and so must have been, Engels speculates, the instinctive 
tendency among the earliest peoples.  
If we consider the most primitive known forms of family ... then the form 
of sexual intercourse can only be described as promiscuous -- promiscuous 
in so far as the restrictions later established by custom did not yet exist.7  
Engels hastens to add that universal promiscuity does not necessarily imply a general 
melee of "mixed mating" but is tolerant of sexual pairing and other formats so long as 
these are understood as non-binding and non-exclusive.  
      The hypothesis of a pre-primitive culture in which marriage as such did not yet exist 
has all the earmarks of a nineteenth century ideal read back into the mythical past. On its 
basis, Engels analyzes the matrimonial customs of all subsequent societies as strictures 
imposed on this original promiscuity of the human herd, strictures whose removal 
requires a revolutionary subordination of all human activity, including sexual activity, to 
the one standard of absolute equality of production. Engels quotes with conviction a 
contemporary kindred spirit, the American anthropologist L. H. Morgan, notable for his 
mid-century studies of the Iroquois, who foresaw a final "mastery over property" and the 
"dissolution" of social relations based on it, foreshadowing "the next higher plane of 
society, a revival, in a higher form, of the liberty, equality and fraternity of the ancient 
gentes.8 For this revival, conjectured ancient cultures provide the template: fictional 
promiscuous societies where males and females participate as equals in reproductive and 
productive activity; a fusion of economic with domestic life indifferent to gender, where 
marriage is irrelevant since every woman is already married in principle to every man, as 
every man to every woman; where all children, conceived and raised in common, have all 
adults for parents; in short, a society in which the family as a distinct social structure 
simply does not exist. Such a vision of a "higher liberty", barely imaginable let alone 
practicable, provided the model for many recent and notoriously violent experiments.  
       More general anthropological opinion now hews to the view that wherever human 
community is found there is inevitably a system of kinship of some sort with distinct 
customs regarding sexual relations. "Central to the social organization of most primitive 
peoples" writes a noted anthropologist, "is the grouping of tribesmen into kin of various 
categories, some of whom one can marry and some of whom one cannot".9 Kinship 
theory is indeed one of anthropology's principal obsessions. Engels, however, would 
                                                
7 Ibid., p.101. 
8 Ibid., p.237. The italics are Engels'. 
9 E.B.Leacock, in an Introductory essay in Engels, The Origin etc. 
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develop a history of kinship beginning with the hypothesis of a primitively promiscuous 
and thus essentially kin-less society, tracing its stages of 'decline' through various kinship 
systems to the institution of monogamy, seen as an institution for the protection of private 
property through "enslavement" of women. The 'consanguine family' (no pure form of 
which, again, is actually known) forms the first stage in this decay; husbands and wives 
possess each other in common to form broad families, the only sexual taboo being against 
relations between parents and offspring. Then in the 'punaluan' system the sexual ban is 
extended to incest between siblings; more definite families are formed from which, 
however, the brothers of wives and the sisters of husbands are excluded. Occupying a 
vast territory between total promiscuity and strict monogamy, is a host of interim 
variations on the marriage/incest theme, expressed through complex kinship regulations 
which establish and conserve clan distinctions, the rules of endogamous (in-tribal) 
exclusions or the exogamous (out-tribal) bartering or stealing of brides and the like. The 
family thus has its definition for Engels within such broad determinations of kinship 
relations, relations typically based on matrilineage since, under such systems, only 
mothers can possibly know who their children are.  
       Out of this miasma emerges a general restriction against marriage between blood 
relatives and a tendency toward 'pairing' which only approximates monogamy since, 
typically, absolute fidelity is required only of females on pain of severe punishment, 
while males remain free to practice polygamy as in many late-barbarian cultures still. An 
abrupt shift from matrilineage to patrilineage as determinative of ancestry is coincided 
with male usurpation of sexuality as a means of securing private property. It is then only 
a short step to the ancient Roman familia (= patrimonium) where the pater familias had 
power of life and death over the whole household, and from there to modern bourgeois 
monogamy under which regime, according to Engels' hyperbole, women are reduced to 
whores and marriage exists exclusively for the pleasure and profit of males.  
The overthrow of mother right was the world-historical defeat of the 
female sex. The man took command in the home also; the woman was 
degraded and reduced to servitude; she became the slave of his lust and a 
mere instrument for the production of children.10  
       While among upper bourgeois families of Engels' day, robber-baron capitalism had 
indeed a degrading effect upon family life, the view that monogamous marriage has its 
sole inspiration in a perverse economics is supported neither in fact nor in principle. It 
rather belongs to an ideological view of human history which, presupposing a primeval, 
natural impulse to social solidarity, sees only the corruption of this pristine order by 
greed and lust as modes of production become progressively more complex and wealth 
more fluid. The promiscuous paradise mutates into an endogamy of hunter-gatherers, 
again into the exogamy kinships of herders and farmers and finally, in the age of 
industrial work, into bourgeois monogamy as the nadir of the human sexual relationship. 
The historic war of classes, clans and sexes ends with private ownership, enforcing 
divisions of labour and the enslavement by some of others through control of the means 
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of production and reproduction. The "revival, in a higher form, of the liberty, equality 
and fraternity of the ancient gentes", the final liberation from the bondage of class, 
corporation, family and state, is to be accomplished at a single stroke in the social 
revolution which would eliminate private property.  
      Engels' account of how sexual freedom is to be renewed in the revolutionary society 
seems dubiously simplistic:  
The first condition for the liberation of the wife is to bring the whole 
female sex back into public industry and this in turn demands that the 
characteristic of the monogamous family as the economic unity of society 
be abolished. (137-80)  
As to the actual form sexual relations and the parenting of children are to take in the new 
order, Engels, like Marx, remains vague. His account of a society of liberated individuals 
no longer limited by moral or institutional constraints on promiscuity and for whom 
monogamous marriage has come to be regarded as a bourgeois convention containing a 
bias against the absolute right to choose whatever form of sexual relationship, parenthood 
or gender preference one should choose, more aptly describes the currently extant 
situation in late-liberal societies so much complained of by conservatives. Engels' view of 
the end of the family would seem to offer, in place of traditional monogamy, two equally 
uncertain alternatives: either the maintenance of the shell of family life as an extension of 
collectivist political policy (generally what happened under most communist regimes) or 
else the fragmentation of the marital bond into a myriad of experimental relationships 
with total emphasis on the element of free choice -- marriage as state-approved sexual 
mating or marriage as socially approved and tolerated promiscuity.  
iii. The Psychopathology of Marriage  
       The theories of Sigmund Freud provide an influential example of the other main 
form of ultra-modernist ideology, namely psychological absolutism, the attempt to 
construct a theory of human self-consciousness based on the redefinition of subjectivity 
as a quasi-biological human instinct. The principal assumption is that there is nothing 
spiritual, supra-natural or even 'psychic' about human psychological life, that it has its 
whole commencement in organic or para-organic impulses, that it is the extension of 
nature into human nature, as it were. Conscious, rational experience is as a whole reduced 
to this source in 'the unconscious', that is, the immediacy of instinctual subjectivity 
conceived as primal psycho-physical energy or an epi-biological drive. Having so 
appropriated the whole human world to this absolute, the new psychologies set up shop 
as the scientific successors to theology and philosophy.  
       Psychological absolutism precisely mirrors the sociological absolutism Engels was 
among the first to expound. Pan-psychism -- as it used to be called -- had its earliest 
proponent in Schopenhauer, whose works Freud knew and admired. Schopenhauer had 
argued that absolute reality is Will, not 'will' in its practical meaning but understood as 
'pure affect', a relentless and irrepressible impulse to selfhood by definition irrational and 
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of which the phenomenal or rational world-for-consciousness is but its 'representation'. 
Nature has its being in this absolute urging or will-to-self; the violence of nature 
generally and the limitless egoism of the human animal being its typical manifestations. 
With Nietzsche will-to-self becomes more closely defined as self-affirmation, will-to-
power -- "freedom as instinct" as he described it. The same ontology of self-feeling as an 
absolute affect has been elaborated from various perspectives: aesthetic with Jung, para-
psychological with Reich and Blavatsky, existential with Jaspers. Borrowing directly 
from Nietzsche's principle, Adler devised a psychoanalysis of dominance and 
submission, an approach later revived with Foucault and others as a general 
phenomenology of power. Freud, however, insisted such a psychology could only be 
'scientifically' argued where instinct is defined biologically, and on this ground adopted 
sexual desire (lat. libido) as the instinctual substance of psychic life.  
       In Freudian science, actual persons -- deliberating, self-conscious individuals -- are 
nowhere to be found, only the erotically charged human animal whose subjective life 
consists entirely in endless excitation, 'cathexis', rationalization and release of libidinal 
tensions. Libido is not to be thought as sexual instinct in the strict biological sense of a 
fixed species-propensity impelling organisms to mate and reproduce. Human libido is 
more than that: a wholly amorphous, indiscriminate, self-centred eroticism that seeks its 
objects for no other purpose than the satisfaction that comes with release of its own 
tensions. In the older moral language, libido is simply lust; in Freud's own term, the 
"Lustprinzip". It is due to its indiscriminateness that human sexuality is inherently prone 
to perversion -- a wisdom tradition knew well enough in other ways but which Freud 
reconstructs in psychiatric terms of a naturally uninhibited sexuality (cf. Engels' primitive 
promiscuity) that suffers various forms of repression and stands in need of restoration to 
'health' by means of clinical techniques of disinhibition.  
       Libido, sexual lust, is not merely a 'factor' in the psychology of individual 
subjectivity; it is subjectivity itself, 'id', the 'unconscious self'. All other aspects of 
selfhood -- 'ego', 'superego' -- are derivative moves. As with Schopenhauer's Wille, libido 
is by definition narcissistic, that is, it is 'auto-erotic', attaching itself to objects 
indifferently whether they be one's own or another's body-parts or even inert things. For 
psychoanalysis, sexuality is 'the' human instinct precisely because it has this primitive 
relation to another inherent in it: a drive to cathexis, of being-for-self-in-another, and it is 
upon this essentially narcissistic relation that Freud took all other relations to be 
constructed. Relentless in seeking its excitation and satisfaction, libido finds itself 
frustrated by restraints imposed by society, an obstacle whose origin turns out to be 
enigmatic for Freud. At first convinced social mores too had an erotic origin, the 
embodiment of psycho-sexual ambiguities arising out of an inner sense of guilt or 
remorse, in later writings, despairing of this argument, he postulating a universal counter-
instinct, the death-wish or thanatos, as responsible for the repressiveness of civilized 
society. Freud's concern to assign libidinal inhibition to a source that is equally 
instinctive rather than simply to some externally restrictive force -- 'culture', 'society' or 
whatever -- springs from the desire to maintain a strict psychological absolutism which 
requires that nothing be brought in from outside, that everything be drawn into the orbit 
of the unconscious life itself and its complex of dynamics: cathexis, conflict, repression, 
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perversion and so forth; so that even the restrictiveness or 'malaise' of moral culture itself 
can be seen as rooted in the unconscious life.11  
       Freud's view of marital relations is of course entirely an extension of his theory of 
universal libidinal narcissism. As the theory runs, the form of libidinal desire alters as the 
body matures and so do its preferred objects of cathexis. The transitions from oral to anal 
to genital to coital forms of excitation and satisfaction are fraught with unique 
psychoneurotic pitfalls: fixation upon one or another sexual object, anxiety or frustration 
in adapting from one object to another, perseveration of earlier in later libidinal forms 
and so on. The resulting dynamics of regression, transference, repression, sublimation 
and the rest were the stock in trade of Freud's ventures into the "psychopathology of 
everyday life".  
      In justifying these pan-eroticism conjectures as a complete account of the human 
psyche, Freud's principal appeal was to clinical evidence; but he also sought to 
demonstrate their plausibility through ventures into other areas of inquiry -- art, 
anthropology, religion. The maturing in the human animal from its infantile libidinal state 
to further forms of sexual expressions -- oral, anal, phallic, genital -- provided Freud with 
the map and model for excursions into the anthropology of human customs and 
institutions, including especially those of marriage and the family, the central theme 
identified as a universal conflict between the demands of sexual instinct and inhibitions 
embodied in a universal horror of incest. Where Engels understood the history of the 
forms of marriage and kinship as a function of modes of production, Freud interprets the 
same from the standpoint of this alleged primeval fear of incest. 'Libido' thus bears the 
same burden in psychoanalysis as 'labour' does in socialist economics: the primal activity 
which, in Engels' phrase, "creates man", that is, defines the human species as human in 
distinction from other animals. If the theory of man-as-labour sought validation in the 
postulation of a pristine economic relation of human beings to nature subsequently 
corrupted as production became increasingly capitalistic, so Freud provides the precise 
psychological counterpoint: the roots of human society not socio-economic but springing 
from libidinal conflicts aboriginal in human nature struggling to come to terms with 
restrictions of its own making. In contrast with Engels he finds in primitive customs of 
marriage, kinship and taboo the further paradigm and proof of his conception of primal 
psychosexual dynamics.  
      His account of the origins of society, marriage and the family is another classic of the 
romanticist mythopoeic appeal to primitive human beginnings, which image provides the 
template against which later civilization and its 'discontents' are then to be judged. For 
Freud, what is 'primitive' is not savage society, however, but infantile sexuality, the 
instinctive and libidinal attachment of a suckling child to its mother. However repellant to 
moral convention, Freud always insisted that infantile sexuality was key to the whole 
theory, oral gratification the original libidinal experience underlying all later forms of 
sexual interaction. Mother-lust is thus a regressive yearning residual in everyone, and as 
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translation of his title is "The Malaise in Culture". 
JACKSON:  FREEDOM AND THE TIE THAT BINDS: MARRIAGE AS  
AN ETHICAL INSTITUTION 
 
 128 
such a principal object of repression throughout life. It is held in check partly by a 
socially inculcated horror of incest whose purpose is to destroy family feeling at its root, 
thereby to make higher levels of social organization possible.12 Partly it remains in 
competition with other modes of sensuality as they appear: with the negative eroticism of 
anal excitation, with the bi-sexual, 'phallic' eroticism of puberty, and finally with the 
'mature' sexuality which appears when reproductive biochemistry leads individuals to 
find their chief erotic satisfaction in the explicit act of mating. In coitus with a mature 
sexual mate, mother-love is consummated in a sublimated form: in the female the male 
has a surrogate mother while her satisfaction is found in appropriating just that role -- 
marrying her father in effect. In these permutations, half symbolic, half bio-erotic, Freud 
turns the traditional relations of marriage to parenthood on its head: infantile lust authors 
a fatal Oedipal triangle in which the wish to possess one parent as sex-object conflicts 
with the wish to negate the other.  
      This hypothesis of a primal libidinal dynamic finds its way into Freud's well-known 
excursion into anthropology, where he finds the primitive origins of the family to lie in 
the erotic subjectivity -- 'unconscious life' -- of the individual. Marriage, family. kinship -
- indeed society itself -- have their basis, not in economics, but in strictures imposed on 
uninhibited libidinal expression to restrict its regressive infantile tendency, to 'civilize' it. 
Freud conjectures the situation of a human 'primal horde' with a dominant male enjoying 
exclusive mating privileges over all females, as with many pack animals. Other males 
and male offspring have no recourse but either to accept celibacy, look elsewhere, or kill 
the father. The latter, however, would only renew competition among the parricidal 
males, a vicious circle that is only avoided if all accept equality with respect to the 
possession of mates. And so, for Freud, 'society' is a mutual pact for the repression of 
elemental lust.  
      Through this piece of fictive palaeontology Freud represents the Oedipus complex as 
the root of the institution of marriage. However 'unconsciously' or symbolically, the 
residual primitive lust to murder one parent to possess the other generates explosive 
libidinal ambiguities. Regression to infantile mother-lust conflicts with the adult sexual 
relation, for which the actual mother and father are the role-models. Elemental, infantile 
libido falls into conflict with its more developed adult forms, repression ensues, only 
resolved if the conflict can be brought to consciousness and sublimated, whatever this can 
entail. The meaning of human culture and custom thus lies in the requirement that the 
domineering narcissism of infantile sexuality be quelled, while keeping it somehow 
satisfied nonetheless. The first is accomplished by suppressing incestuous relations 
between children and parents through a system of kinship and clan taboos designed to 
ban sexual relations between individuals too closely consanguine. The second is 
promoted by a system of rituals, which reinvoke and celebrate the original passions of the 
primal crime, designed to expiate incestuous feelings of guilt. Religion, thought Freud, 
has it source and meaning in the a symbolic reconstitution of the awesome figure of the 
father as author of the ban on sexual relations among kin, its typical rituals reenacting the 
                                                
12 Freud, "Three Essays on Sexuality", Works, v.7, tr/ed. Strachey, Toronto, 1953, p.225. 
JACKSON:  FREEDOM AND THE TIE THAT BINDS: MARRIAGE AS  
AN ETHICAL INSTITUTION 
 
 129 
parricidal event through which the primal horde was originally replaced by the fraternal 
clan.13  
       Religious rites of marriage Freud views entirely from within this perspective. The 
traditional 'bond' of marriage has everything to do with a socially approved signing-on to 
the primal compromise through which the destructive consequences of unlimited libidinal 
passion are avoided. At his most pessimistic, Freud saw nothing positive in this, only a 
fatal necessity of civilization. More optimistically, a psychoanalytical view of a healthy 
sexual union would be one wherein individuals, having somehow surmounted their 
infantile conflicts, are able to give their sexual impulses uninhibited free rein. It is a view 
now solidly established in contemporary popular culture that any limit whatever imposed 
upon free and open eroticism is a sign of sexual oppression and/or repression inimical to 
psychological health.  
       For Freud, human discontent through the ages has its roots in the inhibition of sexual 
instincts and resulting proneness to neurotic complexes, not in a political or economic 
reform of society. It is therapy, not revolution, which is to emancipate humanity, a 'sexual 
liberation' from repression brought about internally by overcoming psychological 
fixations, and externally by ridding culture of its anti-libidinal prejudices. The traditional 
institution of marriage is of all things repressive in this latter sense, being founded upon 
cultural sanctions that limit sexual 'expression', restrict the selection of mates, demand 
permanence in the marital bond and fix the rules according to which one does or does not 
enter into it.  
 
 
III. Marriage As An Ethical Bond 
i. Ethical Institutions  
      In Hegel's systematic account of the forms according to which practical life is 
ordered, freedom or self-determination is at all points the operative principle. This view 
of practice, metaphysically expressible as the view that it is not nature as such that 
animates human action qua human and establishes its essential ends and motives, but the 
breaking in upon nature of a spiritual dimension of self-conscious life. It is a view 
consistent with the general intuition of the ages, assumed and declared in the most 
ancient mythopoeic accounts of the origin of ethical and political order. But it is a view 
with which ultra-modernist anthropology and psychology are clearly at odds, attempting 
as they do to define freedom in terms of natural needs or instincts, reverting to a sort of 
quasi-physiological determinism. The philosophical account of practice, by contrast, duly 
commences from the concept of freedom itself and from the consciousness of it as one's 
own inward, de facto truth; then seeks from that standpoint to know how the relation of 
free human beings to nature -- both to nature generally and to their own human nature -- 
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comes to be drawn into an actual order of life, an objective 'system of right' with freedom 
recognized as its substance and basis.  
       In the Hegelian account, objective freedom has its first expression in legal right, then 
in moral conscience, then as the ethical or communal spirit. Legal and moral right 
represent limited vehicles for the embodiment of freedom which can be complete only in 
a political community where an ethically-minded people explicitly accept and promote 
freedom as the sustaining principle of their everyday domestic, social and political life. 
The law recognizes the individual as a legal 'person-in-general' whose freedom consists 
in a general right of 'ownership', to invest one's interest in anything material, animate or 
intellectual and to appropriate it as 'property', as 'one's own'. Legal ownership thus brings 
the whole of the given world under the form of the human will, laws setting out the 
particular rules according to which things are appropriated, alienated or contractually 
exchanged. As questions of rights to ownership form the chief theme of socialist 
thinking, it can be said that it is in its legal aspect that Engels understood the family 
institution. It is as a legal bond that marriage has been and still is chiefly understood in 
most older cultures: a contract where husbands acquire ownership of their wives in an 
exchange of real property or the like. It is because the law is addressed to the person-in-
general, and not the particular individual, that all are supposed 'equal' under it; but on just 
that very account the law, whether human or divine, appears as externally imposed 
relative to any particular individual, conferring rights only to the degree it is submitted to. 
For this reason the spirit of the law fails directly to engage the individual's subjective 
spirit, the inward sense of freedom, awakening rather a rebellious tendency to place 
oneself beyond the law, whether in acts of outright criminality or, in some more positive 
way, to refuse to 'live by the letter'. In a society of laws, individuals thus know 
themselves as both free and not free, as prisoners of the law as much as liberated under it. 
There is evoked thereby a will to uncover a surer, a less equivocal spring of freedom 
within themselves.  
       Self-determination as the form of the particular will, subjective freedom, has its 
measure, not in ownership and the external force of law, but in the concept of the single 
individual's free agency, guided by the inner voice of reason. Here the autonomous 
individual is the actual author of what is right, not a passive beneficiary of rights under 
the law. From this standpoint, any objective relation of individual to individual -- 
marriage, for instance -- has its source and sole justification in the free subjective assent 
of those involved in it. Self-determination in this subjective sense is in general 'morality', 
and it is in its moral sense, Hegel observes, that the modern world generally understands 
freedom.  
Subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. 
In virtue of the right thereto, a man must possess personal knowledge of 
the distinction between good and evil in general; ethical and religious 
principles shall not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and 
authoritarian precepts to be obeyed, but have their assent, recognition, or 
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even justification in his own heart, sentiment, conscience, insight, etc. The 
subjectivity of the will in itself is its very aim, even its essential moment.14  
       Morality, however, is self-conflicted in another way, on which grounds it too is a 
limited expression of freedom. Assuming the autonomy of the self-conscious subject, it 
opposes to the givenness of the world an objective moral order based on individual 
freedom and brought about through autonomous individual action. But the 'objectivity' of 
this moral order still belongs to the idealism of the subjective will only, a world that 
ought to be but is no actual state of affairs. The unfree world of experience and impulse 
thus remains ever in opposition to the good intentions of the individual's free choice, and 
so the only good morality produces, as Kant admits, is a good will. Put metaphysically, in 
morality, spirit opposes itself to natural impulse; but an autonomy so defined only 
negatively must remain ambiguous, bound to remain entangled in just that which it 
denies. Accordingly, the moral individual can never know in the end whether his actions 
really spring from his own free will or from his own selfish interests, or how indeed to 
tell the one from the other, an ambivalence lying in the subjective standpoint itself that 
renders morality, at least in its purist form, a source of the greatest hypocrisy. The 
'decline of morality' in subsequent Western culture should not be seen as a mere falling-
away, but a tendency to degeneracy lying in the very standpoint of moral autonomy itself.  
       As a consequence of this latent contradiction, morality in its strict form gave way 
historically to later mutations which would seek to conserve the standpoint of subjective 
freedom is other ways. Romanticism is moralism turned ironically against itself, the 
tragic sense of the impotence of an inner freedom nonetheless deeply felt giving rise to an 
unrequited yearning after authentic selfhood expressible only poetically. The form in 
which morality defends itself in the present day is as moral relativism or some variant of 
it. Here freedom is still conceived as belonging primarily to the individual subject, 
though all idea of a rational standard of moral good and evil is abandoned. The sheer act 
of choosing, in and of itself, expresses the individual's freedom, which is not to be limited 
regardless of what actually is or is not chosen. The contradiction remains in that, on this 
account too, the most perversely self-interested actions must be tolerated along with the 
most selfless, as both have their source equally in the individual's absolute freedom of 
choice.  
       It is as a moral relationship, diluted in some such romanticized or relativistic way, 
that marriage is understood in post-modern culture. Not only does it possess the obvious 
instability of a relation which, dependent on nothing beyond individual free choice, can 
just as easily in the next moment be dissolved or displaced by another, but at a deeper 
level it involves the confounding of the amoral and the moral aspects of the union, its 
sexual and its personal dimensions. It was noted generally of morality that hypocrisy 
arises because its unification of spiritual and natural is accomplished only subjectively in 
'conscience', that is, only in a negatively founded inner reflection which cannot, in the 
end, distinguish well-intentioned motives from ill-intentioned impulses. Where morality 
is only the relativism of arbitrary free choice, the indistinguishability between freedom 
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and sensuality becomes ever more marked: sexuality trumps constancy, renders all vows 
retractable, and turns true lovers into temporary libidinal objects.  
      The limit of morality is thus to be found in the want of an objective context for 
freedom, a want that becomes increasingly evident as subjective freedom, rendered 
absolute, eventually degenerates into a principle of moral chaos and decay, producing a 
melt-down of all substantial human relations, customs and institutions. For while freedom 
of choice (as against mere legal right) does recognize the interest of the thinking 
individual and brings this element positively into play, it is unable to reconcile inner 
freedom with the outward way of the world in which it can finally know its freedom only 
in negative or anarchistic action. For such a decadent will, submission to any ethical 
standard whatever will appear as an unacceptable limit, as is now generally the view. On 
the basis of subjective freedom alone, therefore, no objectively free order of life can 
arise, to which inevitability a good deal of recent history attests. Where freedom is 
equated with the sanctity of whatever one chooses to do, so far as this sense of inner 
autonomy remains unconscious of its own limit -- an 'instinctive' freedom in Nietzsche's 
oxymoronic phrase -- then it is indistinguishable from any number of contingent impulses 
and passions. It is often observed the human animal can be more vicious, carnal or 
excessive than any other, a fact which has its root, not in some irredeemable wickedness, 
but in freedom itself, the vivid witness to the infinity of one's inwardness. Once this 
infinity attaches to even the most trivial or dissolute of ordinary passions it lends the full 
force and import of freedom to it, fueling an obsessive and insatiable fanaticism. If 
tradition spoke of the natural human will as 'fallen', it is the same to say an ethically 
unredeemed freedom is in principle anarchic, as much a source of violence and depravity 
as of humane ennoblement.  
       Hegel had already clearly pointed out this potential for decadence in the moral view, 
and proposed beyond it an ethical life in which individual freedom is recognized and 
conserved but as a moment of a more substantial communal and institutional spirit which 
provides the context for its objective realization and satisfaction. What appeared to others 
in and after his time as a need to repudiate rationalistic morality and in some way revert 
to a more 'natural' freedom, was for Hegel rather the need to advance to the standpoint of 
an objective spirit comprehensive of both its natural and subjective elements: the 
subordination of the mere 'ought-to-be' of free choice to a freedom actually lived. For 
Hegel, this step was of world-historical significance: if legal right has been the principal 
basis of institutional life in more ancient societies,  
the right of the particular subject, ... of subjective freedom, is the pivot 
and centre of the difference between antiquity and modern times. This 
right in its infinity is articulated, and as an actual, universal principle 
become constitutive, of a new form of the world. Among its various 
expressions are love and the romantic, the eternal salvation of the 
individual and so forth; likewise morality and conscience. In what follows 
[i.e., further on in PR] it will be treated in [quite] another way: partly as 
the principle of civil society and an aspect of political constitutions, partly 
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as it turns up generally in history, particularly the history of art, science 
and philosophy.15  
      For Hegel, then, subjective 'free choice' is an essential moment in freedom but it is 
not, as for later culture, freedom itself. From it Hegel would distinguish the more 
complete freedom found in what he calls 'ethical life' (Sittlichkeit as opposed to 
Moralität), founded in the intuitive certainty individuals have of their freedom as their 
necessity, not just as a subjectively free will but as the very substance and end of an 
actual practical life. The consequent practical impulse is not simply to affirm one's 
subjective autonomy, but to reproduce, sustain and experience freedom as an objective 
fact, to generate a distinctively human world of concrete cultural institutions wherein 
particular individuals can find the certainty of their own inner freedom reflected and 
through participation in which they may know themselves to be actually free. Thus, on 
the one side, "ethical life is a subjective disposition, though imbued with what is 
inherently right [PR141]", while on the other it is  
freedom shaped into the actuality of a world, [receiving thereby] the form 
of necessity, whose substantial nexus is the system of the institutions of 
freedom and which has its phenomenal [i.e. subjective] side in the 
conscious recognition of their authority. [EN484]  
While participation in an objective ethical life in one sense involves a limiting or 
overcoming of the immediate subjective intuition of freedom it is equally the means of 
completing or fulfilling what lies in it. In submitting to life within a complex of free 
institutions, individuals do not compromise their freedom but know it as confirmed, 
enlarged and enhanced, given substance as a freedom universally and objectively shared. 
An ethically constituted civility engages the conscience of individuals to the extent they 
will it and embrace it. Ethical life thus provides, not only for the disciplining of caprice -- 
the abstract identification of freedom with subjectivity -- but also for the cultivation in 
individuals of a developed consciousness of what their fuller freedom truly is, namely a 
communal life so ordered that individuals find their own freedom recognized and 
guaranteed in it and which they themselves conserve and advance through their own 
actions. But of course, much depends on whether extant institutions actually do have self-
determination as their principle rather than power, property, privilege or whatever -- that 
they are ethical institutions. Only where they are ethical can they provide the means of 
delivering individuals from the abstractness of their unredeemed subjectivity; where they 
are not, they become the most deadly forms of bondage, as has been clearly witnessed in 
the violent and destructive consequences for free institutions of the literal imposition of 
twentieth century ideologies.  
ii. Hegel on the End of Marriage  
       Though Hegel lived half a century and more before Engels and Freud, he would 
seem to have anticipated their arguments even if he had not read their books.  
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When marriage is treated, not in the context of natural right but is 
grounded in sexual instinct or arbitrary convention -- when monogamy, 
for example, is explained in superficial physical terms of the relative 
number of men to women, or when dark feelings of revulsion are 
advanced as the reason behind the prohibiting of consanguineous marriage 
-- such views are rooted in a common notion of a state of nature and a 
natural origin of rights, a notion devoid of a concept of rationality and 
freedom.[PR168]  
       In short, there is no accommodating an account of freedom that appeals to some 
para-natural aspect of human biology, 'instinct' or 'species-activity', to the ethical or 
spiritual view of marriage. If individuals were primarily moved to form mature sexual 
liaisons by a need to sublimate infantile eroticism, the measure of married love would be 
whether wife and husband found in each other adequate surrogates for a residual animal 
attachment to breeding parents. And were marriage an economic protocol for the 
regulation of reproduction, then marriage is tolerable only where it serves the subsistence 
of tribe or clan, and there is absolutely nothing personal about it. Indeed, the appeal to a 
psychology or sociology of marriage modeled on the sciences of nature -- as the so-called 
'human sciences' now generally are -- requires that any idea of individuals freely 
committing themselves to conscious and reasonable bonds be summarily abandoned or 
else demoted to the rank of superficial customs grafted upon a unique but otherwise 
dumb animal species. Foisting in zoological categories as a means of 'explaining' 
intelligent human life, however, not only grossly contradicts the possibility of the very 
scientific perspective it assumes, but so to omit a priori the rational dimension in human 
experience inevitably renders the account of it strained and contorted.  
       In Hegel we find a far more subtle treatment of these matters. The unity of spirit and 
nature, to use the speculative terminology, is neither to be understood reductively -- spirit 
as natural or nature as spiritual -- nor as an abstract relation in which each is defined as 
the negative of the other -- nature as the non-spiritual, spirit as the non-natural. 
Combinations and permutations of such views -- spiritualism, naturalism, romanticist 
nature-spiritualism, psycho-physicalism, scientific dualism etc. -- do not make them any 
less spurious; the relation is rather to be understood as a dynamic one, that is, spirit as 
neither super-natural nor a natural mode of existence but a reality latent in nature and 
attaining to actuality in human self-consciousness. For Hegel, 'spirit' is life so far as it has 
freedom as essence; it is no otherworldly entity but the infinite form life itself assumes in 
thinking, practical beings. Hegel's own unique psychology accordingly understands 
human sensibility, imagination, emotion, desire, etc. as prototypical of a free thinking and 
willing, while his sociology similarly understands social, moral and cultural institutions 
as having their implicit end in the resolution of this subjective potential for freedom into 
an objective form.  
       Thus, unlike 'scientific' accounts of human institutions, Hegel's account is at least 
consistent with the ordinary experience of life as divided, on the one side, as one's animal 
species-life with all its given physiological and psychological contingencies, on the other 
side, as one's free existence-for-self or self-conscious individuality. Animals are not true 
JACKSON:  FREEDOM AND THE TIE THAT BINDS: MARRIAGE AS  
AN ETHICAL INSTITUTION 
 
 135 
individuals, he observes, their souls no more than their species moving instinctually in 
them. The human being, however, has its own essence for object, as Hegel puts it; it is its 
species, an autonomous self-relative or 'thinking' individual. For such an individual, its 
being is not simply its nature, nor is its nature alien to it. Rather nature has the specific 
character of its own, as existing for it, and this is what is meant by saying that, in spirit, in 
self-conscious life, nature is in principle completed and sublimated. In this sense, as more 
than simply beings of nature, human beings are not, nor could they be, moved by instinct 
alone; rather by the will to make their instinctive life their own, to appropriate it as a 
subordinate moment within a freely emergent self-conscious life. It is a common wisdom 
that, unlike innocent animals, when human beings submit to instinct they corrupt their 
true nature.  
       Ethical institutions have their beginning in the deliberate ordering of the given 
material and organic conditions of life in accordance with a principle of rational freedom. 
Hegel speaks of the family as basic among ethical institutions in this sense, that its end is 
the 'domestication' of the human animal, the latter's first liberation to the free 
individuality upon which all further possibility of community, of civil life guaranteed in 
an ethically founded state, wholly depends. While certainly prefigured in nature -- murres 
build nests, mate for life, rear young etc. -- domesticity among human beings is 
qualitatively unique in that its end is not the survival of the species but the creation of the 
conditions of freedom. For so far as 'human nature' entails in itself the sublimation of 
nature, the motive to domesticity does not lie in any instinctive impulse to mate, 
reproduce etc., but in the will to place all such matters in the service of a wider intent, a 
'higher' end, namely to bring the whole impulsive, need-dominated aspect of natural life 
under the discipline of a common life founded in free personality.  
Marriage is the immediate form of ethical relationship containing, first, the 
moment of natural vitality in general, the totality of the life-process of the 
species, and second, the element of self-consciousness in virtue of which 
the merely implicit unity of an external relation between sexual partners is 
transformed into a spiritual relation of self-conscious love. [PR161]  
       The passion of love, says Hegel, is freedom as it appears in feeling: the feeling of 
being recognized and fulfilled as a person in the intimate relation to another whose 
person one desires in turn to affirm and possess as one's own. Marriage is the decisive act 
of translating this passion of personal mutuality into a permanent, everyday, personal, 
practical and physical reality, to 'institutionalize' it and make a new life together. In this 
decision to live as one it is not only an untamed sexuality that is willingly sacrificed to 
this supra-natural union, but the totality of one's spiritual-bodily life: one's talents and 
needs, temperament and character, fortunes and happiness, one's life and death. All are 
surrendered, to be taken up into and sublimated in the freely chosen wedded state. 
Marriage is thus not a sexual union primarily, or even necessarily, but a bond wherein the 
whole range of natural needs and contingencies, including the sexual, are brought under a 
freely instituted domestic order. As such, marriage is a first liberation from nature, not of 
course in any literal or absolute sense, but as the vehicle for the reconciliation and 
satisfaction of natural impulses and needs within a discipline obedient to a calling beyond 
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the call of nature itself, namely the desire to cultivate and extend the possibilities for a 
rational life through a relation in which each recognizes the other as first of all a free 
spiritual being, a unique and special person.  
If subjectively marriage may appear to spring from the mere inclinations 
of those involved or from the concerns and contrivances of parents and so 
forth, its objective commencement lies rather in the free assent of these 
persons to make themselves one person and to surrender their natural and 
particular personhood to this union. And if on its face this amounts to a 
self-limitation it is in truth their liberation since, in it, they attain to a true 
consciousness of themselves. [PR 162]  
       That is to say, it is only as explicitly recognized in a living relation with another free, 
self-conscious being, wherein each defers wholly to the other, that one's individuality 
assumes objectivity -- for oneself no less than for the other -- and one's personhood, as 
confirmed in this loving relation, is no longer merely a kind of isolated interiority. 
Though the end of marriage is an ethical union it is nonetheless essentially a bodily 
relation. It is this in the sense that in it everything bodily is brought under a discipline in 
which physical and psychological needs, in being mutually fulfilled and satisfied are also 
thereby limited and transcended, clearing the way for a relation that is explicitly free and 
personal. Individuals attracted maritally to each other know the experience of a powerful 
desire, not merely to possess each other sexually, but to 'settle down', make a home, share 
in a rational domestic order wherein each is devoted to the other's material, emotional and 
spiritual well-being. While almost always involving sexual passion, marriage 
comprehends a much wider range of mortal contingencies: of sleeping and waking, 
accommodation and security, daily bread and daily work, a common leisure and 
experience of the world, the rearing of children perhaps, a society of mutual friends, 
provision for each other in sickness and health, one presiding finally over the other's 
death and memory.  
       As Hegel points out, in marriage it is the whole of one's species-being that is set 
aside to make way for another principle to awaken and mature. The 'sacramental' aspect 
of marriage lies just in this mutual offering up of mortal life in its totality, thereby to 
initiate and enjoy the fuller satisfaction that springs, not from meeting bodily need as 
such, but from this mediated, redeemed and sanctified by recognition each of the other as 
a 'soul-mate', an alter ego, in whom the consciousness and confirmation of one's personal 
wholeness is secure. It is indeed this immediate linkage of sensuous feeling with mutual 
fulfillment of self through another that fires and sustains the passion of marital love, 
which, unlike the love of friends or heroes, in whom one admires virtue, ability or 
likeness of mind, is not simply spiritual but spiritual-physical, personal-sensual, in which 
ambiguity is generated the familiar paradox of married love: that it is the other as person 
one wishes nonetheless to embrace in all his or her fleshly vitality, while contrariwise, 
passionate exchanges between lovers typically evoke an extreme of tenderness beyond 
what the sexual act itself can offer, springing from the intensely personal character of 
reciprocated affections.  
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iii. Sexuality and the Ethics of Love  
       It is common to speak of married couples as 'made for each other.' But "how it comes 
about just these two particular individuals should marry is at bottom a matter of 
contingency"[EN163]. In pre-modern cultures (especially "amongst peoples who hold the 
female sex in scant respect [PM 162, Add.]"), the decision is taken by parents or others 
according to considerations of compatibility, clan, property, political power etc. The 
marriage is first imposed and the couple left to learn to love and respect one another as 
best they can. But from the reflective standpoint of the modern world, it is subjectivity, 
particular individuality that comes first. Accordingly, two individuals, each infinitely 
unique yet 'made for each other', through some miraculous turn of fate 'find' each other, 
directly 'fall' in love, 'lose' their hearts etc. Such terms signal the element of sheer 
accidentality that belongs essentially to the subjective ideal of romantic love, whose basic 
claim is that true love is only to be found in inner feeling, in individual 'hearts'. The 
ambiguity that notoriously attaches to romantic love springs from just this its root in 
subjectivity, in feelings fated to hover between the sexual and the platonic, the former 
fueling the latter, where what belongs to elevated moral sentiment and what simply to 
lust are only abstractly distinguishable from each other.  
       Love affairs founded on sheer accidentality are thus of their nature unstable, 
evocative of typical romantic themes of idealized individuality, unrequited passion, 
inconstancy, tragic consequence and the rest. For, where love is grounded only in the 
inner passions of particular individuals, the union is one that only 'ought' to endure, the 
ideal in fact inevitably wrecked on the reef of fickle sensualities and fates. Subject to 
changing affect and circumstance, the fires of love are prone to go out, and those who 
'fall' thoughtlessly in love just as thoughtlessly fall out of it. Belonging to the 'natural' 
aspect of human psychology, sexuality, while a prime means for the expression of love, is 
also destructive of it so far as it makes lovers its prisoner. Apathy, infidelity and even 
contempt for each other are the all but inevitable consequences of a union that has no 
more than inner intensity of feeling rather than open and objective inter-personal 
recognition, as its principal measure. It belongs to marriage as an ethical union, 
accordingly, that beyond being freely chosen, its primary object must be the institutional 
commitment to an objectively disciplined common life that is more than, though 
comprehensive of, a life based on subjective feeling.  
       What is ethical in marriage consists in the consciousness of this unity as a substantial 
end, sharing in common, in love and in trust, their entire existence as individuals; in 
which attitude, where actual, natural passion sinks to the level of a physical moment 
which in its very satisfaction is destined to pass away. The spiritual bond secures its right 
thereby as the substance of marriage, which, as thus inherently indissoluble, rises above 
the contingency of passion and the transience of particularistic caprice. [PR 163]  
     This principle of substantiality, of ethical indissolubility, is what is affirmed in the 
rites in which marriage is typically instituted, requiring of a couple they make an overt 
decision to forsake all others and to subordinate their passionate life wholly to this new 
objective relation in which the passions are to play only an incidental and expressive role. 
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For the romantic view, on the contrary, the marriage rite appears as at best a mere 
traditional formality or civil requirement, at worst a superficiality alien to the true 
marriage of souls since detracting, as Schlegel argued, from an inwardness of love more 
purely expressed in unfettered surrender to sensual impulse -- "an argument" Hegel adds, 
"not unknown to seducers". [PR 165] It is not only that the consequences of a 
commitment to 'unfettered passion' can be obsessive and thus degrading, but that it 
obstructs the development of the 'substantial' love of which Hegel speaks, i.e., a love 
rendered ethically objective. And the latter is impossible where there is not first a openly 
declared commitment to self-imposed sexual restraint, a restraint civilized intuitions 
know as the ordinary sense of sexual chastity and modesty.  
       In these times 'chastity' and 'modesty' have an amusing, even neurotic ring to most 
ears, an indication of unhealthy inhibitions, the assumption being that they express 
merely moralistic virtues. But they have also an objective, ethical meaning, one measure 
of which might be the different experiences of married and casual sexuality. In purely 
sexual encounters, bodily self-consciousness tends to be amplified one way or the other, 
whether in furtiveness born of shame, or in exaggerated elaboration of the particulars of 
the sexual act as if to find in it a surrogate for the infinity of love -- the futility of the 
erotic ideal. In married love, on the contrary, an already assumed and accepted 
subordination of passionate to ethical intimacy breeds an attitude of unembarrassed 
familiarity regarding everything bodily. The true character of the sexual relation in 
marriage lies in this, that by virtue of an ethical commitment that goes beyond the 
contingency of bodily desire, lovers are free to abandon themselves to their passions in 
the knowledge that their physical relation is already redeemed by a more substantial, 
personal communication obtaining between them. In this sense in marriage both sensual 
and ascetic motives are wedded and satisfied, the one sanctifying the other.  
       It is in this sense Hegel speaks of married love as redemptive of the passions, thus a 
form of liberation. Sexuality is certainly the prefiguration of love in nature [EN368], for 
which reason it does in fact provide a most telling metaphor and means of expressing the 
love between self-conscious human beings. It could with justice be said that there simply 
is no such thing as pure sexual love where human beings are concerned, the element of 
self-consciousness ineradicable and bound to intrude. This is why libidinal passions, 
submitted to outside any ethical context do tend to degrade, their indulgence a bondage 
rather than a bond. Marriage is by contrast 'sacred' in that it entails what amounts to a 
vow of limited celibacy regarding the instinctive life, the commitment to a liaison in 
which the passions, far from being denied, are reciprocally offered up to each other so 
that both are free of them because free in them. And where, through a freely enacted 
subordination to a personal relationship, sexuality is in this manner at once contained and 
fulfilled, where it is no longer an unlimited obsessive and domineering passion, a society 
of liberated individuals first becomes possible, and this, for Hegel, is the true aim and end 
of family life.  
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IV. Conclusion - Limits Of The Marital Tie  
       In Hegel's speculative language, ethical institutions are forms of the 'objective spirit', 
that is, of communal structures willingly entered in and adhered to by individuals who 
find in them the confirmation and security of a freedom they otherwise possess only 
subjectively or intuitively, but which, in institutional life, has for them the form of an 
objective fact, an order of life in which their reality as persons is explicitly and actively 
cultivated. Of the three principal human institutions -- the others being civil society and 
the political community -- the family is for Hegel the most 'immediate' in so far it has its 
point of departure in given natural characteristics and relations. One's place in a family 
may be as spouse, parent, sister, infant, cousin etc. or several of these at once, but the 
ethics of family life is not simply based on the living out of stereotyped roles of wife, 
father, adolescent or whatever, distinctions which are essentially physiological in their 
basis, but on the instilling in each member a consciousness of his or her particular and 
transient natural role as belonging to and dependent upon the unity of family life in its 
totality, expressing an overall rational end. Accordingly, the family, so far as it is a 
'natural' community, does not have its end in itself but in another lying beyond it and 
which it serves. This end is a wider human freedom of which the family forms only the 
foundation. The human family thus exists, not for the breeding of children, but of 
persons, of individuals who, having passed through its discipline, acquire a sense of 
independence, not only with regard to the ordering and satisfaction of bodily needs, but 
also, through having undergone and experienced all the psycho-physical ramifications of 
family life -- of age, gender, nurture, intimacy, obedience, authority and so forth -- an 
independence and competence in subsequent relations to others as free individuals. The 
experience of family life is thus the prior education presupposed by a free society.  
       Ethical life in its most complete form is for Hegel the political community, a fully 
realized ethical state, synthetic of legal, moral, familial, personal and social values and 
founded on the recognition of freedom as their common, unifying principle. Although 
family and civil society are the twin foundations of this overall ethical order, each in 
itself is a limited form of that freedom and does not stand on its own. The general limit of 
the family lies in that, though its end is spiritual, it still has one foot in nature as it were. 
Accordingly, while the experience of family life is the means by which free and 
reasonable personality is first cultivated, and while this end is the very core of the ethics 
of family life, yet the family order is neither of itself absolute nor an adequate 
embodiment of freedom due to the element of natural contingency that remains dominant 
in it: contingencies of birth, death, material circumstance, determination of roles by sex, 
maturity, genealogy and so forth. Civil society, on other hand, presupposes a collectivity 
of individuals already liberated from nature at least in principle; a freedom they seek to 
realize through the practical exploitation of nature and human nature in the pursuit of 
privately conceived interests. It has its limit in turn in this, that since whatever human 
beings accomplish is dependent wholly on luck, talent, opportunity and a host of other 
material and social conditions, it is a freedom only realized as a never-ending competition 
of all against all where some succeed and some fail and a universal human welfare thus 
remains no more than an abstract ideal.  
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       That marriage, even as an ethical institution, is limited has only partly to do with the 
internal instability of marriage as a relation between particular individuals, subject to 
vicissitudes having to do with sexual, social or familial compatibility, conflicts of 
personality, infidelity and the like. Its more fundamental limit lies in the ambiguity 
entailed in being partly grounded in the natural passions even while the means of their 
sublimation. Where this limit is unrecognized, where the natural family order as its stands 
is regarded as absolute, the bond then turns into bondage, the kindly family order into 
despotism. Prone to this tendency are traditional dogmatic characterizations of marriage 
as necessitated by nature, required by God, rooted in inexorable sexual instincts, an 
instrument of raw economic ends, a 'political' state where males have the legal ownership 
and use of women and children -- views ever current but which Hegel relegates to the 
phenomenological pre-history of a properly ethical conception of marriage.  
      For the greater part of human history, however, the family has indeed been treated as 
the supreme ethical institution, and still is in large parts of the contemporary world. To 
the extent it is so treated, the family, and by extension clan and ancestry, are regarded as 
the absolute standard for all community, the dominant factor in all social and class 
relations and forming the nepotistic basis of political power and its continuity. Marriage 
in such cultures is thus the all-important, sacramental event, the root of all other relations, 
a bond imposed and maintained by religious authority and legal force, involving fixed 
rights, obligations and rules -- the subjection of women as property (as Engels), taboos of 
caste and tribe (as Freud) -- to which the participants are bound to adhere at pain of 
severe repudiation, punishment or even death.  
       In Western culture, however, where the basis of marriage is moral rather than legal, 
the family is no longer thought to be rooted in some inexorable natural or divine law, but 
rather in the feelings and choices of particular individuals -- in 'love' in the subjective or 
romantic sense, with all its sexual-platonic ambiguity. Thus as the family order was the 
foundational communal relation in earlier societies, for modernity it is rather 'civil 
society' that provides the paradigm for all other relations, including marriage itself. In the 
West, the freedom of the individual reigns as dogma, which means that all relations are to 
be conceived as obtaining between particular individuals who do not give up this 
particularity of their freedom in them; relations which are therefore never more than 
'social', that is, collective rather than communal, freedom itself understood as subjective, 
the absolute and unqualified right of autonomous individuals expressed in universal 
rights, free choice, the right of dissent and so forth. What is witnessed in the present time 
as the 'decline of family values' and the disintegration of the marriage tie is due in large 
part to this moral-romantic conviction that institutional life has its sole justification in the 
self-justifying freedom of particular individuals, a view that nonetheless contains key 
ambiguities which have progressively brought about a degeneration of the moral 
standpoint itself from its original rational shape to its contemporary expression in moral 
relativism and the positive celebration of caprice.  
       The reactionary view of this post-modern decay is to see it as a catastrophic 
eventuality, evoking, perhaps, a wish to return to an earlier, more rigorous morality of 
family life, or even to a pre-moral and anti-modernist spiritual fascism, as most recently 
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in Islamism. But the continuing decline of the moral-romantic view of marriage and 
family life is not the result of any delinquency as to principle, but consists in the 
progressive revelation of a contradiction already native to that principle itself. The 
consolidation of subjective freedom as an absolute in modern democratic culture has 
meant that the model of 'civil society' -- community as any set of external relations 
among otherwise autonomous individuals resting on their assent -- has become more and 
more definitively the model for all institutional life, including that of the family. The 
'moral' and 'romantic' views of marriage are earlier shapes of this individualistic ideal. 
The more the social model has come to prevail, the more the inconsistency between 
individual freedom and the idea of inviolable trans-individual bonds has become evident. 
The marriage bond itself then falls into controversy, increasingly suspected by 
libertarians who, as many feminists, see it as self-evidently contrary to freedom and thus 
a form of oppression, and vainly defended by those who would somehow restore a 'God-
given' family ethic with emphasis on fixed gender roles and damning as 'un-natural' any 
deviation from the 'natural' model of the heterosexual breeding family. The real issue 
underlying, however, is the apotheosis of subjective freedom which both sides in the 
argument assume -- for even the return to a natural ethic of family life must be a matter of 
individual 'choice'.  
       The challenge to think beyond this definitive post-modern conflict, now reaching its 
critical phase, requires a more complete understanding of objective ethical relationships 
and the fuller freedom they confer. So long as the right of the individual as such is 
supreme, such understanding is, of course, impossible. For the limit of the subjective 
standpoint, expressed metaphysically, lies in this: that the reconciliation of spirit to nature 
remains incomplete. Either freedom is affirmed as an immediate existential 
consciousness, which knows itself nonetheless to be fatally limited by time, nature and 
circumstance, or conceived as the practical goal of a conquest of nature that ideally issues 
in the triumph of a wholly human order of freedom. But this 'nonetheless' and this 
'ideally' betray the fact that a disjunction between freedom and nature remains as the 
underlying assumption, so that any liberation affirmed or sought in this manner is in 
principle incomplete; not an actual freedom. The more complete freedom is to be found, 
not in paradoxical acquiescence or endless activism, but in a redemption of nature 
through freedom, which is at once a realization of freedom as nature. And this is what an 
ethically ordered life is: in it the appearance is transcended of a subjective life 'in here' to 
which an alien nature 'out there' stands opposed. In ethical institutions the demands of 
subjective freedom and of the natural and historical conditions of human life are equally 
met and in principle reconciled; in them, nature and freedom belong to the one life in 
which the former is conserved and sublimated and the latter rendered real and self-
fulfilling.  
       Marriage as ethical is such a reconciliation, though at the level of 'natural 
individuality'. That is, it involves individuals as living, physical beings with given sexual 
and emotional natures as well as distinct personalities and personal histories. In freely 
sacrificing the whole of their bodily fate to the marriage tie, the partners come to know 
one another in their very bodily presence and difference, and in so doing find their 
isolated, mortal existence redeemed, since fixed and held in the other's free loving regard. 
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In married intimacy there is thus a distinct liberation, not only from sexual differences, 
but from all the limitations of bodily existence: one knows oneself as loved entirely, for 
oneself, as one is, for better or worse, even 'unto death' -- loved, that is, in the unity of 
one's natural-spiritual being. In this free relationship, the given elements of nature and 
human nature are neither denied, violated, nor suppressed, as in some purely spiritual or 
romantic-platonic union. On the contrary, within the marriage bond, one's immediate 
nature, even in its crassest biological aspects, is conserved and dignified, afforded a 
universal, spiritual meaning, just as, on the other hand, one's spiritual self-consciousness 
is given substance as an actual life.  
       That naturalistic and romanticist views of the institution of marriage -- as either a 
wholly legal or a wholly moral relation -- are no longer tenable, introduces into marriage 
many implications that only in recent times have begun to come to light. As no longer an 
order imposed by nature, it is clear that subjective freedom is an essential desideratum: 
the relation of marriage must of all things be between self-consciously free individuals. 
Moreover, where nature is no longer the absolute standard, there are new and valid 
questions to be raised as to what constitutes 'normal' physical relations. A wholly celibate 
marriage is thus in principle quite conceivable, as is some variation of marriage between 
those more at home physically with those of their own gender. Reproduction confined 
strictly to marriage, once considered its prime obligation, becomes secondary to the 
fulfillment of its ethical end; there are many alternative opportunities and arrangements 
whereby children may be brought into family life and adequately nurtured.  
       But what is more difficult is to identify and surmount the limits of the moral-
subjective view where insistence on the radical autonomy of married partners becomes a 
major obstacle to the stability and permanence of the relation. Clearly there is no route 
back to the 'traditional family', only the one ahead. The infinity of the subjective 
standpoint, the truth of individual freedom, whatever its limits, has worked its way 
throughout the whole of contemporary culture to become an irreversible presupposition, 
so that older notions of the marriage bond as in some divine or human legal sense literally 
trumping the element of individuality and personal love is no longer tenable. This new 
attitude cannot be denied; the demand that a married relation be such as to engage and 
respect the freedom of one and the other party has put an end to a host of literal and 
material reasons why, in the past, it was thought married couples should be required to 
'stick together', no matter what, even where the light of love and respect has gone out in a 
marriage, where violence or indifference has turned it into a living prison, where its 
essential end, the fidelity that ensures redemption of the passions, has been compromised, 
or again, where passion itself has become a tyrant, dominating and disrupting 
matrimonial harmony. Again, the moral respect for individuality (among other factors) 
has meant a momentous release of both women and men, physically and mentally, from 
the older obligations and strictures of married life that bound each to fixed gender-
determined roles, a change whose most striking result has been the flowering of women 
into vital and complete individuals and a corresponding liberation of men from the 
prejudices of a limited maleness. Of course, the inroads made by subjective freedom in 
contemporary culture has also its negative side in the excessive dogmatic casualness with 
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which sexual promiscuity or 'openness' is aggressively pursued as a matter of principle 
while the idea of marriage as institutional chastity is ridiculed and belittled.16  
       For many cultures, and to a degree still in the West, the concept of the natural family 
persists, though the modern concept of marriage as a moral-romantic relation between 
free individuals has in democratic societies superseded it. The great difficulty in modern 
times is to recognize what is limited in this latter concept; to reveal the impotence of 
relationships based on no more than subjective choice, relationships that cannot liberate 
individuals from the bondage and finitude of their bodiliness, a bondage expressed in the 
infinitely unrequitable character of contemporary sexuality. It is this 'immortal' freedom, 
which the commitment to an objective ethical-physical relationship in marriage is meant 
to establish through willing subordination of bodily life as whole to a regime that answers 
first to the requirements and obligations of personal love.  
       It is thus a living, day-to-day freedom that is formed and cultivated in the marriage 
relation and through it passed on to others. That the family has long been said to be the 
'foundation of society' cannot mean that it is itself the ultimate form of community but 
that it is the principal instrument of liberation from the particularities of bodily life, 
which makes a society possible. For as the primary end-product of family life is the 
experience of being educated and confirmed as a person, a free individual, marriage in its 
ethical meaning is more than a merely natural order of life or a romantically founded 
relation; it is able to tolerate any number of options and variations not applicable in a 
relation that is 'eternal' in only a legal or moral sense. It may indeed not be essential one 
marry at all: one may choose celibacy to satisfy a special calling, or out of widowhood, 
necessity of age or physical condition, or simply according to disposition. A single 
person may sustain a relatively satisfying home life in other ways, through maintaining a 
circle of relatives or intimates, the single adoption of children and the like, while those 
                                                
16 Much nonsense has been made of Hegel's remarks on the psychological, metaphorical and spiritual 
import of natural male-female differences, especially with respect to institutional roles. The perspective of 
the ancient poetic account of such matters (e.g., as in Sophocles' Antigone the family is woman's eternal 
destiny, as worldly struggle is man's) is contrasted with the bourgeois-romantic understanding of family 
roles in his own day, where husband and wife are thought to bring specific emotional and intellectual 
talents and aptitudes to the unity of a family life no longer seen as absolute, but as secondary to the 'higher' 
freedom of individual autonomy. Hegel's account of gender differences and their sublimation have been 
repudiated especially by some feminists who, writing from within ultra-modernist assumptions of radical 
individualism or socialism, can see nothing in them but the outdated prejudices of a nineteenth century 
European male.  
But one understands little if anything of Hegel if it is not recognized that he is already thinking beyond the 
standpoint of modernity, thus also beyond the merely bourgeois, romantic view of the family. His remarks 
concerning gender differences (for that matter concerning psychological, cultural, racial, religious or any 
other differences elsewhere in his works) have accordingly to be understood entirely in terms of his vision 
of a freedom which is reconciled to nature, and not the abstract freedom for which natural differences are 
either absolute or else wholly irrelevant.  
A most excellent and balanced survey and commentary concerning this issue is found in A.M. Stafford, 
"The Feminist Critique of Hegel on Women and the Family", Animus 2 (1997), www.swgc.mun.ca/animus 
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whose nature precludes heterosexuality may still find opportunity for stable domesticity 
in chosen singleness or some variation of a loving spousal relation.17  
       The essential point is that some form of spiritual domestication is achieved in which 
the passions and needs of natural life can find a measure of fulfillment which allows for 
their muting and the cultivation beyond them of a life free to become centred wholly on 
personal and spiritual ends. But if marriage and family life have long been the chief 
institutional form in which the spiritual domestication of the human animal has been 
effected, with the emergence in the contemporary world of a much fuller and wider 
consciousness of freedom, it is to be expected the older forms of the marriage tie can no 
longer assert exclusive legitimacy.  




                                                
17 Clearly, these elaborations on the contemporary implications of the Hegelian position are not to be found 
in Hegel's text, but it is argued they nonetheless follow from it. That Hegel could set forth no more than the 
principle of a post-moral, post-modern view of the family (as other institutions) within the wider context of 
an overall philosophy of freedom; that for his comments on the extant actualities of ethical life he could 
only draw on the still 'pre-post-modern' ethos of his day; these considerations in no way limit the 
contemporary import or relevance of his conceptions. The thrust of much of nineteenth and twentieth 
century ideology may be described as precisely the attempt to realize, through extension and radicalization 
of what are still essentially modern categories -- and thus with limited success -- the same post-modern, 
post-historical world whose logic Hegel had already sketched philosophically. . 
